Rajasthan High Court Quashes Rape Charge Due to “Subsisting Marital Relationship“

The Rajasthan High Court rape charge against a man in R v State of Rajasthan & Ors was quashed on 2026-07-22 after the court partly allowed a criminal revision petition.

Justice Kuldeep Mathur concluded that the offence was not *prima facie* attracted because the prosecution material itself demonstrated that the parties were engaged in a “subsisting marital relationship” at the time of the alleged assault, despite the lack of formal registration.

This decision hinges on the court’s interpretation of evidence—including the exchange of garlands and a *mangalsutra*, prolonged cohabitation, and the inclusion of the petitioner’s name on a child’s birth certificate—as proof of an asserted marital status, thereby invoking the long-standing exception in Indian law that shields a husband from a rape charge by his wife.

The ruling highlights the complex intersection of cultural practices, legal formalities, and sexual consent in the nation’s criminal justice system.

Justice Mathur’s bench reached this conclusion even though the prosecutrix claimed the marriage had never been formally solemnised or registered as required by law, alleging the petitioner had forced himself upon her after promising to register the union later.

For individuals navigating the legal system, understanding the nuances of judicial interpretations regarding preliminary evidence, such as in cases involving sexual assault and related charges, is critical. This is often examined closely at the initial stages of a criminal trial, including when applying for anticipatory bail.

Judicial Interpretation of an Unregistered Marriage

The core of the High Court’s ruling focused on whether the petitioner was a “stranger” to the prosecutrix or whether their relationship had crossed the threshold into a perceived marital bond. The two had met following an advertisement for the prosecutrix’s re-marriage after her divorce.

According to the prosecutrix’s account, the petitioner and she exchanged traditional symbols of marriage—garlands and a *mangalsutra*—at a temple, after which the petitioner allegedly claimed family disputes prevented immediate formal solemnisation and promised to complete the registration later. It was during the period following this ceremonial exchange, while living together, that the assaults allegedly occurred.

The contested promise of marriage

The prosecutrix consistently maintained that she believed the petitioner had married her. The later allegation that the marriage was not solemnised was based on the petitioner’s subsequent failure to fulfill his representation that it would happen later.

This put the case squarely in the grey area between a breach of a promise to marry—which the Supreme Court has ruled does not automatically constitute rape unless the promise was false from its inception—and a de facto marital relationship.

The court, however, prioritised the couple’s conduct. Justice Mathur noted that the entire prosecution case proceeded on the assertion that the petitioner had, in fact, entered into a marriage with her. The key was the relationship’s character at the time of the alleged sexual acts.

Evidence of shared life and parental status

Crucially, the court considered the fact that the prosecutrix gave birth to a child, and the petitioner’s name was officially recorded as the father on the birth certificate. This piece of documentary evidence strongly supported the assertion that, regardless of legal formalities, the relationship was being “asserted and treated as that of husband and wife.”

In his observation, Justice Mathur stated that the allegations, “even if taken at their face value for the purpose of considering the charge,” indicate the acts were committed while the relationship was treated as marital.

The court found that the prosecution material therefore did not disclose that the man was a stranger to the woman at the relevant time, thereby failing to meet the *prima facie* standard for rape outside of marriage.

The Marital Exception and Section 376 IPC

The decision throws a spotlight on India’s complex and controversial approach to sexual assault within relationships. The ruling is fundamentally predicated on Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC (now Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023), which exempts a man from a charge of rape by his wife, provided she is over the age of 18.

This exception has remained a deeply contentious issue in Indian jurisprudence, leading to constitutional challenges that are currently pending before the Supreme Court of India. Critics argue that it undermines women’s autonomy and rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Historical roots and international contrast

India’s marital rape exception traces its origins back to a 17th-century common law doctrine established by English jurist Matthew Hale, who asserted that a wife grants “unretractable matrimonial consent” upon marriage. This historical premise has been almost universally abandoned by Western democracies, with over 150 countries having criminalised marital rape.

Despite significant legal reform, including the 2013 changes following the Nirbhaya case and the recent BNS recodification in 2023, India has retained this exception. The Union government has previously opposed striking it down, arguing that criminalisation could be “excessively harsh and disproportionate” and destabilise the institution of marriage.

The BNS and the retained exception

The implementation of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023, which replaced the IPC, was seen by some as an opportunity to address this legal anomaly. However, the BNS retained the provision, ensuring that sexual acts by a man with his wife remain outside the definition of rape if she is over 18.

This legal reality means that when courts establish a relationship as marital, even an informal one, they are legally obligated to consider the exception.

The Rajasthan High Court’s application of this exception to a relationship lacking formal documentation signals an increasing willingness among some judges to apply the protected status to couples who have cohabited and publicly presented as husband and wife. This suggests the legal definition of “wife” in this context is interpreted expansively to protect the sanctity of the relationship, even at the expense of protecting consent.

Pattern of Similar Rulings in the Rajasthan High Court

The ruling by Justice Mathur is not an anomaly but forms part of a noticeable judicial trend within the Rajasthan High Court to quash rape charges stemming from relationships that have soured or broken down. This pattern often involves judicial skepticism toward allegations made after a consensual relationship ends, particularly when a marital element is asserted.

A series of recent rulings illustrates this judicial inclination to protect the institution of marriage and to avoid criminalising the breakdown of relationships between consenting adults, even where there is dispute over consent later claimed to be vitiated by a false promise.

Recent rulings on relationship-based complaints

In recent months, judges in the High Court have repeatedly intervened to halt criminal proceedings in relationship-based cases, citing concerns about the misuse of rape laws. This movement aligns with the Supreme Court’s caution against criminalising consensual relationships that merely end badly, especially in the context of live-in relationships or interfaith marriages.

For example, Justice Baljinder Singh Sandhu quashed proceedings on July 8, 2026, finding that the couple, who had married before the FIR, had reunited and were living together with family consent. Continuation of the case, he noted, would “jeopardize their matrimonial life.”

The table below summarises several key rulings demonstrating this trend toward judicial review of rape charges where a prior consensual or marital relationship existed.

Judge	Ruling Date	Offence Quashed	Basis for Quashing	Relevant Statute
Justice Kuldeep Mathur	2026-07-22	Rape (376 IPC)	Subsisting marital relationship (unregistered but evidenced).	IPC/BNS Marital Exception
Justice Baljinder Singh Sandhu	2026-07-08	Criminal Proceedings (Rape FIR)	Parties reunited and living together as husband and wife.	Section 528 BNSS (Quashing)
Justice Kuldeep Mathur	2026-07-29	Repeated Rape (376(2)(n) IPC)	Complainant aware of her own subsisting first marriage, reducing inducement claim.	Consent under Misconception
Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand	2026-05-15	Rape (FIR Quashing)	Petitioner was the legally wedded husband; FIR deemed an abuse of process.	IPC/BNS Marital Exception
Justice Anil Kumar Upman	2026-05-11	Rape/Abduction (FIR Quashing)	Failed consensual relationship between two adults was misused to file criminal case.	Misuse of Criminal Law

Quashing based on post-FIR marriage

Another common thread in these rulings involves cases where the parties choose to marry or reconcile after the First Information Report (FIR) has been lodged. In April 2025, Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand quashed a rape case after the accused married the complainant, citing the “sanctity of marriage” and arguing that continuing the proceedings would disturb their married life.

While courts often caution that these rulings are based on the “peculiarity of the marriage” and should not set a general precedent for quashing serious offences based on compromise, the underlying philosophy is clear: preserving a familial unit is often deemed a higher priority than prosecuting the initial allegation of sexual assault within that relationship.

Legal Analysis: The Standard of *Prima Facie* Evidence

A criminal revision petition, which the man filed, typically challenges the lower court’s framing of charges. The High Court’s task was to assess the material presented by the prosecution—the FIR, statements, and evidence—and determine if the elements of the crime, in this case, rape under Section 376 IPC, were met on a *prima facie* basis.

This means evaluating whether the evidence, taken at face value, is sufficient to proceed to trial.

Justice Mathur’s judgment implicitly ruled that once the prosecution’s own material established a relationship that fit the description of a subsisting, asserted marriage, the case shifted from a matter of rape by a non-spouse to an act falling under the marital exception. This legal manoeuvre effectively shut down the trial on the rape charge before the complexities of consent and registration could be fully litigated.

The burden of proof and *prima facie* standard

The ruling highlights the distinction between a promise to marry that is subsequently broken and a relationship that is publicly asserted as marital, even without legal solemnisation.

Had the court found that the man’s promise was false from the beginning, made solely to procure consent for sex, the charge of rape based on consent under misconception of fact (Section 90 IPC) would likely have been upheld.

But because the couple lived together, exchanged marriage symbols, and had a child recognised by the father, the court inferred a deeper, shared intention to maintain a marital bond.

This elevated the relationship from a mere failed promise to a state that mirrored a de facto marriage in the eyes of the law, thereby triggering the exception. The court essentially placed the weight of cohabitation and social recognition above the missing legal paperwork.

Distinguishing consensual breakdown from fraud

The distinction the High Court draws is crucial. In cases where sexual consent is obtained by fraud, the consent is nullified, and the offence of rape stands.

However, the court here viewed the matter not as a fraudulent attempt to procure consent, but as a marital relationship that was established through traditional rituals and shared life, but later broke down due to the petitioner’s failure to complete the registration.

A balance payment failure, or any other civil dispute, for instance, is treated differently under the criminal justice system than a relationship breakdown.

This approach runs the risk of penalising women who rely on traditional or common-law recognition of marriage, only to find that the law recognises the man’s marital privilege without enforcing the man’s reciprocal duty to formalise the union. It underscores the precarious position of women in informal relationships seeking justice for alleged sexual violence.

Broader Implications for Sexual Offence Law

The decision in R v State of Rajasthan & Ors. provides ammunition to both sides of the contentious marital rape debate. For those arguing for the protection of familial structures from state interference, the ruling reinforces the idea that couples who choose to live as husband and wife should be shielded from the criminal court, even when the marriage lacks strict legal definition.

Conversely, for women’s rights advocates, it is another example of judicial overreach that prioritises the marital status over the autonomy and bodily integrity of the woman. They argue that the focus should always remain on the absence of consent, irrespective of the relationship status.

Concerns over women’s autonomy

Legal experts, like Advocate Rosemary Raju, have repeatedly stressed that the marital rape exception conflicts directly with the constitutional rights of women. The interpretation used by Justice Mathur—that a ceremonial exchange and cohabitation create a “subsisting marital relationship” that cancels out a rape charge—can be seen as further eroding the legal capacity of women to withdraw sexual consent within any cohabiting arrangement.

If the relationship is deemed marital because of social conduct, the woman loses the right to prosecute her partner for non-consensual sex, potentially even in the absence of a legally recognised bond.

This sends a chilling message to women seeking to file FIRs against partners in complex or failed live-in relationships or marriages that were never fully formalised. It is essential that individuals seeking to apply for anticipatory bail in such matters fully understand how the court will interpret the relationship history.

The unaddressed charges

It is crucial to note that the criminal revision petition was only *partly* allowed. The FIR against the petitioner also included a charge related to him deliberately spreading a life-threatening disease, as he was reported to be HIV+. The High Court’s ruling quashed only the rape charge; the proceedings related to the spread of disease were left intact and will presumably proceed to trial.

This separation underscores that while the court granted the petitioner protection under the marital exception for the alleged forced sexual acts, it did not dismiss the gravity of the other serious criminal allegations. The petitioner will still face prosecution for the other components of the FIR, emphasizing that the court’s decision was a narrow application of the rape statute’s exception, not a wholesale exoneration.

The broader debate about the misuse of rape laws in cases of relationship breakdowns remains active. While the Supreme Court has cautioned against criminalising every failed relationship, rulings like this demonstrate the difficulty courts face in distinguishing genuine sexual assault from retribution following an emotional fallout.

As long as the marital rape exception remains on the statute books, similar, controversial judgments are likely to continue, forcing the Supreme Court to eventually provide a definitive ruling on the constitutional challenge.

In the context of the Rajasthan High Court ruling, a “subsisting marital relationship” refers to a de facto relationship where the parties publicly presented themselves and acted as husband and wife, even if they lacked formal legal registration or solemnisation.

The court looked at actions like the exchange of marriage symbols, cohabitation, and identifying the man as the father on a child’s birth certificate as proof that the relationship was asserted and treated as marital.

The ruling directly relates to the marital rape exception found in Indian criminal law, specifically Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC (now Section 63 BNS 2023). This exception states that sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, provided she is over 18, is not rape.

By determining that a “subsisting marital relationship” existed, the High Court effectively placed the man under the protection of this exception, nullifying the rape charge.

No, the High Court only quashed the charge of rape under Section 376 IPC. The petition was only “partly allowed.” The First Information Report (FIR) also included a separate, serious charge alleging that the petitioner had deliberately spread a life-threatening disease (HIV+). The criminal proceedings regarding this additional charge were not quashed and will continue against the petitioner.