The Delhi High Court has declared that plaintiffs are generally not entitled to a court fees refund when their cases are referred to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

This significant ruling, issued by Justice Amit Bansal on May 23, 2022, clarifies the nuanced conditions for such refunds, specifically distinguishing between referrals initiated by an arbitration clause and those aimed at settlement.

Understanding the Refund Distinction

The decision in A-One Realtors Pvt. Ltd. v. Energy Efficiency Services Ltd. (CS(COMM) 610/2019 & I.A. 15338/2019) underlines that a refund of court fees, under Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, primarily applies to matters referred for settlement via Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

It marks a crucial distinction for litigants and legal practitioners navigating India’s alternative dispute resolution landscape.

Justice Amit Bansal, a third-generation lawyer with expertise in arbitration and commercial laws, emphasized that a litigant cannot claim a court fees refund if a suit is dismissed due to a lack of cause of action under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.

The court extended this logic to cases where an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is granted, leading to parties being referred to arbitration.

The rationale behind this stance is straightforward: if a plaintiff incorrectly files a civil suit when an arbitration clause should have been invoked, they have pursued the wrong legal avenue from the outset. Consequently, the court reasoned that such a plaintiff should not benefit from a court fees refund under these circumstances. This principle reinforces the importance of invoking correct legal remedies.

Section 8 versus Section 89 Explained

The core of the Delhi High Court’s judgment hinges on the difference between Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 8 deals with situations where a valid arbitration agreement exists, compelling judicial authorities to refer the parties to arbitration.

Conversely, Section 89 of the CPC focuses on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms aimed at settlement. This includes arbitration, conciliation, mediation, or Lok Adalat, explicitly for the purpose of achieving an amicable resolution between parties. The critical term here is “settlement,” indicating a conscious effort by the court to facilitate an agreement.

The Court Fees Act, 1870, specifically Section 16, provides for a full refund of court fees when a court refers parties to any of the dispute settlement modes outlined in Section 89 of the CPC. This provision was designed to encourage amicable resolutions and alleviate the burden on the judicial system.

The A-One Realtors Precedent

The ruling originated from a case where an application filed by the defendant, Energy Efficiency Services Ltd., under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was allowed on March 31, 2022. A sole arbitrator was then appointed to adjudicate the dispute between A-One Realtors Pvt. Ltd. and Energy Efficiency Services Ltd.

A-One Realtors, the plaintiff, argued for a court fees refund based on Section 89 of the CPC, citing a Supreme Court judgment in RV Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar Dixit. However, the defendant opposed this request. Justice Bansal clarified that the RV Solutions reference was a “passing direction,” not a binding precedent, for cases where Section 8 is invoked.

The court explicitly stated that the matter in A-One Realtors was not referred under Section 89 of the CPC for settlement. Instead, it was referred for adjudication to a sole arbitrator after an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was allowed. This distinction proved pivotal in denying the court fees refund.

Broader Context: Delhi’s Evolving Refund Landscape

This Delhi High Court decision comes amid broader legislative shifts aimed at refining court fee refund policies in the region. The legal framework surrounding court fees and ADR has been continuously evolving, reflecting efforts to reduce judicial backlog and promote out-of-court settlements.

Understanding these developments is crucial for litigants and legal professionals. The distinction drawn by Justice Bansal ensures that the intent behind different statutory provisions is respected, preventing the indiscriminate application of refund benefits.

The Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026

A significant development impacting court fees in Delhi is the Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026. This amendment, passed by the Delhi Legislative Assembly on a Tuesday around January 7, 2026, and later assented to by President Droupadi Murmu on February 19, 2026, was officially notified on March 6, 2026. It introduces a uniform full refund of court fees for amicable settlements.

The new Act substitutes Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and eliminates Section 16A, which previously allowed only a 50% refund for private settlements.

PWD Minister Parvesh Sahib Singh, who tabled the proposal, highlighted its importance, stating, “It is a major relief to the people because earlier, they used to get full reimbursement only when they settled the matter inside the court and 50 per cent for settling the matter outside court mutually.

But now, with this amendment, people will get a full refund of court fees whether they settle the case through the court or outside.” This legislative change aims to further encourage settlements at any stage of proceedings, whether court-intervened or private.

Prior Legal Interpretations and Supreme Court Views

The Delhi High Court has consistently maintained its position regarding the non-refundability of court fees for Section 8 referrals. This consistent stance has been a guiding principle in various civil cases. However, Supreme Court rulings have offered varied interpretations over time, contributing to the complexity.

For example, in 2021, the Supreme Court, in High Court Of Judicature At Madras Rep. By Its Registrar General v. M.C. Subramaniam And Others, adopted a liberal view.

It upheld court fees refunds for private out-of-court settlements, suggesting that Section 89 of the CPC was not a strict prerequisite for Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The Court indicated that formal court referral to ADR might not be necessary for a refund.

However, a more recent Supreme Court ruling in Jage Ram v. Ved Kumar & Ors. on February 1, 2025, presented a stricter interpretation.

This decision stated that a court fees refund under Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, is not permissible if parties settle privately, outside the specific mechanisms outlined in Section 89 of the CPC. This suggests a potential tightening of refund criteria at the highest judicial level.

These evolving interpretations underscore the dynamic nature of judicial review concerning alternative dispute resolution and financial aspects like court fees. The Delhi High Court’s consistent differentiation provides clarity within its jurisdiction, even as broader legal perspectives continue to develop. Such distinctions are vital for predicting outcomes in various types of litigation.

Implications for Litigants and Legal Strategy

The Delhi High Court’s ruling holds significant implications for how litigants approach disputes, particularly those involving arbitration clauses. Parties must now carefully assess the nature of their claim and the appropriate legal path, lest they incur non-refundable court fees.

This decision means that simply having a case referred to arbitration, even if mandatory under a contract, doesn’t automatically qualify for a fee refund. Lawyers will need to provide clearer advice on these distinctions, especially when drafting initial pleadings and considering the strategic invocation of arbitration clauses. It’s a point that could reshape initial litigation strategies.

For businesses, this ruling emphasizes the need for well-structured contracts that clearly define dispute resolution mechanisms. Understanding whether an arbitration clause falls under Section 8 or Section 89 can save substantial legal costs down the line. It places a greater premium on pre-litigation analysis and adherence to contractual terms.

The emphasis on filing a suit in the correct forum initially also aligns with the broader judicial goal of efficient dispute resolution. It discourages exploratory litigation where parties might initially try their luck in court before being pushed into a contractual arbitration process.

Judicial Scrutiny on Arbitration Processes

Justice Amit Bansal’s judgment also reflects a broader judicial trend of scrutinizing the specifics of arbitration referrals. This isn’t just about court fees; it’s about upholding the integrity of the arbitration process itself and ensuring proper legal procedure. His background, including being empanelled as an Arbitrator on the panel of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre, gives him a deep understanding of these matters.

The court’s insistence on differentiating between various types of referrals highlights the judiciary’s commitment to ensuring that statutory provisions are applied precisely. It means that the mere act of arbitration initiation does not automatically trigger all associated benefits if the initial legal route was misjudged. This judicial rigor contributes to a more predictable legal environment.

Other rulings by Justice Bansal further illustrate his meticulous approach to arbitration law. He has, for instance, ruled that a letter consenting to the unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator does not constitute a waiver under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act, potentially invalidating the appointment. This demonstrates a consistent focus on the procedural correctness and statutory adherence within arbitration.

Such judicial clarity is essential for reinforcing confidence in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. When courts delineate the exact conditions under which specific legal provisions apply, it reduces ambiguity for all parties involved, promoting more informed decisions. It also sets a precedent for how arbitration-related applications are handled by the courts.

The Financial Impact on Disputing Parties

The financial implications of this ruling for disputing parties can be substantial. Court fees, particularly in commercial disputes, can amount to significant sums. Denying a refund in Section 8 arbitration cases means that plaintiffs effectively pay twice if they initiate court proceedings that are later redirected to arbitration as per their contract.

This financial consequence serves as a powerful incentive for parties to strictly adhere to their arbitration agreements from the outset. It pushes for a more disciplined approach to dispute initiation, prioritizing contractual obligations over initial court filings. The cost of missteps can be considerable for businesses and individuals alike.

Consider the example of an arbitrator being ordered to refund a portion of fees, as seen in a separate case by Delhi High Court Justice Prathiba M. Singh on March 30, 2024. In that instance, ₹6,00,000 (Six Lakhs Indian Rupees) was refunded from total fees of ₹14,00,000.

While this concerned arbitrator fees, it highlights the significant sums involved in dispute resolution and why court fee refunds are a critical consideration for litigants.

Type of Referral	Legal Basis	Court Fees Refund Eligibility (Pre-2026 Delhi Amendment)
Arbitration via Section 8 A&C Act	Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996	Generally NOT Eligible (as per Delhi High Court ruling)
ADR for Settlement via Section 89 CPC	Code of Civil Procedure, 1908	Eligible for Full Refund (under Section 16, Court Fees Act)
Private Settlements (outside ADR/court)	Direct Agreement	50% Refund (under former Section 16A Delhi-specific)
Amicable Settlements (Post-2026 Delhi Amendment)	Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026	Eligible for Full Refund (irrespective of mechanism)

Looking Ahead: The Future of ADR and Fee Refunds

The Delhi High Court’s ruling, coupled with the recent legislative amendment in Delhi, paints a complex but evolving picture for alternative dispute resolution and court fees. While the judicial pronouncement clarifies existing distinctions, the legislative changes aim to simplify and encourage settlements more broadly. It creates a dual pathway for understanding refunds.

The Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026, aims to make the refund process more accessible and uniform, encouraging early resolutions. This legislative push is a direct response to the ongoing challenges of court backlogs and the need for efficient justice delivery. It represents a progressive step towards making ADR more financially attractive.

However, the judicial distinctions, like the one made by Justice Bansal, will likely remain relevant for cases falling outside the scope of amicable settlements or those where procedural adherence is strictly enforced. The legal landscape is constantly adapting to promote resolution while maintaining the integrity of legal processes. This dynamic environment requires continuous vigilance from legal professionals.

Ultimately, these developments signal a concerted effort within the Indian legal system to optimize dispute resolution. It’s about striking a balance between promoting amicable solutions through financial incentives and ensuring that litigants follow the correct legal procedures. This ongoing refinement will continue to shape how civil cases are managed in the coming years.

When is a plaintiff entitled to a court fees refund in arbitration cases?

A plaintiff is generally entitled to a court fees refund when the matter is referred for settlement under Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This specific provision aims to encourage amicable dispute resolution through various ADR mechanisms.

Why did the Delhi High Court deny a refund for Section 8 referrals?

The Delhi High Court denied the refund for Section 8 referrals because it involves a party invoking a contractual arbitration clause, rather than the court referring the matter for settlement. The court viewed the initial filing of a civil suit in such a scenario as pursuing a wrong remedy, thus negating the refund entitlement under Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

How does the Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026, affect refunds?

The Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026, significantly simplifies refunds by allowing a full refund of court fees for all amicable settlements, regardless of whether they occur through formal ADR mechanisms or private agreement. This amendment aims to encourage settlements at any stage of the proceedings in Delhi.

Halsey, 30. September 2026, abgerufen am 30. September 2026 (englisch).

The Delhi High Court’s ruling on court fees in arbitration cases provides critical clarity for litigants and the legal community.

This decision, from May 23, 2022, by Justice Amit Bansal, specifically differentiates between arbitration initiated under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) referrals for settlement under Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

In essence, plaintiffs typically won’t get a court fees refund if their case moves to arbitration simply because an existing agreement mandates it.

This ruling came in the case of A-One Realtors Pvt. Ltd. v. Energy Efficiency Services Ltd., where an application under Section 8 was allowed, and a sole arbitrator appointed. The plaintiff sought a court fees refund under Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, citing Section 89 of the CPC.

However, the court found that the referral was not for “settlement” as envisioned by Section 89, but rather a consequence of the pre-existing arbitration agreement, thereby denying the refund.

Understanding the Refund Distinction

Justice Amit Bansal, a seasoned legal professional with a background in arbitration, reiterated a core principle: a litigant isn’t entitled to a refund of court fees if their plaint is rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for failing to disclose a cause of action. He extended this same reasoning to the context of Section 8 arbitration referrals.

The judge highlighted that if a plaintiff opts to file a civil suit despite having an arbitration agreement, and the matter is subsequently referred to arbitration under Section 8, they have essentially pursued an incorrect remedy. In such instances, the court held that the plaintiff shouldn’t be eligible for a court fees refund, drawing a clear line in the sand for those considering litigation.

Section 8 versus Section 89 Explained

The fundamental distinction lies in the intent and legal basis of the referral. Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, primarily operates when parties have a pre-existing arbitration agreement. It compels judicial authorities to refer disputes to arbitration, limiting judicial intervention and upholding contractual commitments.

In contrast, Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, introduced to ease court burdens, empowers courts to refer disputes to various ADR mechanisms—including arbitration, conciliation, mediation, or Lok Adalat—specifically for the purpose of achieving a “settlement.” The presence of this explicit goal of settlement is what activates the refund provision under Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

The Court Fees Act, 1870, specifically Section 16, facilitates a full refund of court fees when cases are referred through Section 89 for settlement. This incentive aims to encourage parties to resolve their disputes amicably, thereby reducing the strain on conventional court proceedings. The differing purposes of these sections are central to the court’s interpretation.

The A-One Realtors Precedent

The specific case that led to this clarification involved A-One Realtors Pvt. Ltd. versus Energy Efficiency Services Ltd. The defendant had filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which the court granted on March 31, 2022, appointing a sole arbitrator.

The plaintiff subsequently argued for a court fees refund, relying on Section 89 of the CPC and a previous Supreme Court judgment, RV Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar Dixit.

Justice Bansal, however, distinguished the RV Solutions precedent, categorizing its refund directive as a “passing direction” rather than a binding “dicta” for all Section 8 cases. He clarified that in the A-One Realtors matter, the referral was not made under Section 89 of the CPC for settlement purposes.

Instead, it was a direct consequence of an application under Section 8. Therefore, the court concluded that A-One Realtors was not entitled to a court fees refund under Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

Broader Context: Delhi’s Evolving Refund Landscape

This judicial clarification by the Delhi High Court occurs amidst a dynamic evolution of court fees refund policies in the National Capital Territory. Legal frameworks are continually refined to balance access to justice with efficient dispute resolution, often through encouraging alternative mechanisms.

The ruling underscores the importance of precision in legal applications and understanding the specific conditions under which statutory benefits, like fee refunds, are granted. It serves as an important benchmark for future litigation and policy adjustments within the legal ecosystem.

The Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026

Adding another layer to the discussion, the Delhi Legislative Assembly passed the Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026. This pivotal amendment, reported around January 7, 2026, and officially notified on March 6, 2026, after receiving presidential assent on February 19, 2026, ushers in a new era for court fees refunds in Delhi.

It aims to streamline and simplify the process, fostering a more conducive environment for amicable settlements.

The Act fundamentally alters the refund structure by substituting Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and repealing the Delhi-specific Section 16A. The latter previously allowed only a 50% refund for private settlements.

PWD Minister Parvesh Sahib Singh emphasized that this amendment now ensures a full refund of court fees for amicable settlements, irrespective of whether they occur through court-referred ADR or private agreements. This move is designed to significantly relieve litigants and promote out-of-court resolutions at any stage of a dispute, making it a critical legislative update.

Prior Legal Interpretations and Supreme Court Views

The Delhi High Court has consistently distinguished between referrals under Section 8 and Section 89 regarding court fees refunds. This judicial consistency provides a clear guidepost within the local jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court of India has, at times, offered varied interpretations, contributing to a nuanced national landscape.

For example, in 2021, the Supreme Court, in High Court Of Judicature At Madras Rep. By Its Registrar General v. M.C. Subramaniam And Others, adopted a more liberal approach.

It affirmed that court fees could be refunded even for private, out-of-court settlements, suggesting that Section 89 of the CPC was not an absolute prerequisite for Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The Court implied that formal court referral to ADR was not always necessary to trigger a refund.

However, a subsequent Supreme Court ruling in Jage Ram v. Ved Kumar & Ors. on February 1, 2025, presented a stricter view.

This decision held that a court fees refund under Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, is not permissible for private settlements unless they occur through the specific mechanisms outlined in Section 89 of the CPC.

This shift indicates a potential tightening of the criteria for refunds outside of formally structured ADR processes, contrasting with earlier, more expansive interpretations.

These contrasting interpretations from the Supreme Court highlight the ongoing legal debate and the dynamic nature of judicial thought on ADR and court fees. While the Delhi High Court maintains a clear jurisdictional stance, the broader national legal position continues to be refined through higher court pronouncements. This provides both challenges and opportunities for legal strategy across India.

Implications for Litigants and Legal Strategy

This ruling fundamentally alters how litigants, particularly plaintiffs, must approach disputes where an arbitration clause exists. The financial stakes are significant, as pursuing an incorrect remedy can result in substantial, non-refundable court fees. This places a greater burden on initial legal assessment and strategic planning.

Legal counsel must now meticulously evaluate the contractual provisions for dispute resolution before initiating any court action. Advising clients to adhere strictly to arbitration agreements from the outset will become paramount to avoid unnecessary costs. This preemptive legal analysis could become a cornerstone of effective litigation management.

For corporations and individuals frequently involved in commercial contracts, the decision underscores the critical importance of robust dispute resolution clauses. Clear, unambiguous arbitration agreements, and an understanding of their implications under various legal sections, are more vital than ever. This clarity can mitigate financial risks associated with procedural missteps.

The court’s stance also aligns with broader judicial efforts to encourage adherence to contractual terms and minimize frivolous litigation. By imposing a financial consequence for circumventing an arbitration agreement through initial court filings, the judiciary aims to promote more efficient and appropriate dispute resolution pathways. It discourages forum shopping and promotes a more streamlined approach to justice.

Judicial Scrutiny on Arbitration Processes

Justice Amit Bansal’s judgment is not an isolated incident but rather indicative of a broader trend within the judiciary to apply rigorous scrutiny to arbitration processes. This isn’t solely about the financial aspect of court fees; it extends to ensuring the procedural integrity and statutory compliance of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.

The court’s careful differentiation between Section 8 and Section 89 referrals emphasizes that not all pathways to arbitration are treated equally under the law, particularly when it comes to ancillary benefits like fee refunds. This meticulous approach helps reinforce the distinct roles of different legal provisions, preventing their misapplication.

This level of detail in judicial rulings enhances the predictability of legal outcomes for complex commercial matters.

Justice Bansal’s own background, including his previous role as an empanelled Arbitrator on the panel of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre, provides him with unique insight into the practicalities and nuances of arbitration law. His rulings, therefore, carry significant weight and are often deeply informed by a comprehensive understanding of the field.

His other decisions further exemplify this precision. For instance, he has ruled that a letter consenting to the unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator does not constitute a waiver under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act, potentially invalidating the appointment ab initio.

This consistent focus on statutory adherence and procedural correctness helps to solidify the legal framework surrounding arbitration, fostering greater confidence in its efficacy and fairness.

The Financial Impact on Disputing Parties

The financial ramifications of this ruling are considerable for litigants. Court fees can represent a substantial initial outlay, particularly in high-value commercial disputes. A denial of a court fees refund in Section 8 arbitration cases means that plaintiffs bear the burden of court fees without the benefit of a judicial resolution, effectively doubling their costs if they then proceed with arbitration.

This financial consequence serves as a potent deterrent against initiating court proceedings when a clear arbitration clause governs the dispute. It pushes parties towards a more disciplined and contractually compliant approach to resolving disagreements, encouraging them to trigger arbitration directly rather than engaging in preliminary court battles that might prove futile and costly.

To put the potential costs into perspective, consider a separate instance where Delhi High Court Justice Prathiba M. Singh, in an order issued on March 30, 2024, directed an arbitrator to refund ₹6,00,000 (Six Lakhs Indian Rupees) from total fees paid of ₹14,00,000.

While this concerned arbitrator fees rather than court fees, it vividly illustrates the significant financial sums involved in dispute resolution, reinforcing why the issue of a refund of fees is so critical for disputing parties.

Type of Referral	Legal Basis	Court Fees Refund Eligibility (Pre-2026 Delhi Amendment)
Arbitration via Section 8 A&C Act	Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996	Generally NOT Eligible (as per Delhi High Court ruling)
ADR for Settlement via Section 89 CPC	Code of Civil Procedure, 1908	Eligible for Full Refund (under Section 16, Court Fees Act, 1870)
Private Settlements (outside ADR/court)	Direct Agreement	50% Refund (under former Section 16A, Delhi-specific)
Amicable Settlements (Post-2026 Delhi Amendment)	Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026	Eligible for Full Refund (irrespective of mechanism)

Looking Ahead: The Future of ADR and Fee Refunds

The recent Delhi High Court ruling, combined with the progressive Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026, signifies a pivotal moment for alternative dispute resolution and court fees in India. While the judicial decision emphasizes procedural distinctions, the legislative changes aim to broadly encourage and facilitate amicable settlements.

The Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026, is poised to have a substantial positive impact, making court fees refunds more accessible and uniform. This legislative intent is clear: to incentivize early and out-of-court resolutions, thereby alleviating the persistent issue of case backlogs and promoting a more agile justice system. It’s a significant push towards a more user-friendly dispute resolution environment.

However, the judicial distinctions, such as those articulated by Justice Bansal, will continue to play a crucial role. They will ensure that the legal framework is applied with precision, particularly in cases where the nature of the arbitration referral or procedural compliance is a contentious point. The evolving legal landscape demands ongoing attentiveness from all stakeholders.

These developments collectively underscore a concerted effort to refine and optimize dispute resolution mechanisms in India. The goal is to strike a delicate balance: providing financial incentives for settlement while upholding the integrity and proper application of legal processes.

This dynamic environment promises to reshape the trajectory of civil cases in the years to come, offering both clarity and new opportunities for efficiency in the legal system.

When is a plaintiff entitled to a court fees refund in arbitration cases?

A plaintiff is generally entitled to a court fees refund when the matter is explicitly referred for settlement under Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This section covers various Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms aimed at achieving an amicable resolution.

Why did the Delhi High Court deny a refund for Section 8 referrals?

The Delhi High Court denied a refund for Section 8 referrals because such referrals stem from a pre-existing arbitration agreement, not a court-mandated process for settlement. The court reasoned that if a plaintiff initiates a civil suit despite a valid arbitration clause, they have chosen an inappropriate legal path, thus forfeiting the refund under Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

How does the Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026, affect refunds?

The Court Fees (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2026, simplifies and expands court fees refunds in Delhi. It now allows for a full refund for all amicable settlements, whether achieved through formal ADR mechanisms or private agreements, and at any stage of the proceedings. This legislative change replaces previous provisions that offered only partial refunds for private settlements.